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1 Introduction
The real e¤ect of money growth and the welfare cost of steady ination have been two central
issues in monetary economics since mid-1960s. Due to their simplicity, dynamic general equilibrium
models with cash-in-advance constraints have been the most prototypical setups to address these
issues.1 Even when cash is required only for consumption purchases, Wang and Yip (1992) establish
a negative real e¤ect of steady ination in the presence of labor-leisure trade-o¤ when capital and
labor are Pareto complements in production. Their conclusion remains valid under the endogenous
growth framework, as shown by Gomme (1993), Jones and Manuelli (1995), and many others. In
our paper, we revisit this issue by examining whether steady ination may foster real activity and
whether the optimal ination rate may depart from the Friedman rule if the underlying labor market
is subject to search and entry frictions. The incorporation of labor-market frictions is particularly
relevant because the central force for generating a negative real e¤ect of money growth is the labor-
leisure trade-o¤, which depends naturally on labor-market conditions.
It is noted that the empirical evidence fails to lend consistent support to a negative relationship
between steady ination and real economic activity. For example, while conventional studies by
Fischer(1983) and Cooley and Hansen (1989) document such a negative relationship in cross coun-
tries, recent works by Bullard and Keating (1995) and Ahmed and Rogers (2000) nd zero or even
positive correlation between money and output growth in low-ination industrialized economies.
Moreover, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the real e¤ect of anticipated ination is largely
insignicant when the level of ination is low.2
In our paper, we provide a plausible theory to explain the empirical ndings: a positive real
e¤ect of money growth might be present in low-ination regimes when the economy lacks a central
planner (or Walrasian auctioneer) and exhibits labor-market frictions. More precisely, by allowing
labor-market frictions and several important dimensions of labor-related trade-o¤s, our paper iden-
ties a new channel that characterizes the long-run e¤ects of ination on employment and capital
accumulation. This new channel may account for di¤erent consequences of money growth on the
macroeconomic variables as well as for normative prescriptions that depart from the Friedman rule,
1Lucas (1980) shows money superneutrality in a one-sector neoclassical growth framework when only consumption
purchases require cash in advance. By requiring investment purchases to use cash, Stockman (1981) identies a
negative real e¤ect of money growth via discouragement to capital accumulation. By allowing ination uncertainty
in a Lucasian monetary economy, Dotsey and Sarte (2000) nd insignicant real e¤ects of money growth.
2For example, Khan and Senhadji (2000) nd that ination signicantly reduces growth only when the level of
ination is above 1-3% for developed countries and above 7-11% for developing countries.
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yielding important monetary policy implications.
Specically, we follow the idea developed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissaridis
(1984) and Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) by postulating that both vacancy creation and job
search are costly and that vacancies and job seekers are brought together by a matching technology
exhibiting constant returns to scale. We depart from this prototypical random search and matching
setup to consider competitive search that was developed by Peters (1991) and extended by An-
dolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). This framework allows us to model capital accumulation under
a dynamic general equilibrium setting in a tractable manner while allowing for market frictions
highlighted in search and matching models.
Since the purpose of our paper is to examine the consequence of labor market frictions for
ination and growth in a monetary economy, our model also depart from the Merz-Andolfatto
framework in two aspects.3 On the one hand, we follow the neoclassical transactions-time monetary
model by assuming that costly activities such as vacancy creation and job search intensity are all
in terms of labor and time allocation. This feature enables us to assess thoroughly the real e¤ects
of steady ination via the labor-leisure-search trade-o¤ in the presence of labor market frictions.
On the other hand, rather than focusing exclusively on Hosios(1990) rule of e¢ cient matching,
we also consider the possibility of an ine¢ cient bargain whereupon a rm, facing an outside option
normalized to zero, decides whether to accept a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an additional employee
by a large household. In so doing, we obtain an equilibrium income distribution resembling
the neoclassical benchmark, thus enabling better understanding about the role of labor-market
frictions (in lieu of strategic bargaining) played in the long-run relationship between steady ination,
employment and economic welfare and providing more clear contrast with ndings in frictionless
neoclassical models. In short, our model structure permits various crucial decisions: rms vacancy
creation (intensive margin) and households labor participation (extensive margin) as well as search
intensity (intensive margin). The interaction between extensive margin and intensive margin is
magnied by the matching technology where vacancies and searching workers are complementary
to lead to thick matching, which may be referred to as the matching externality e¤ect.
The punch-line nding is that in addition to the conventional negative e¤ect of steady ination
on real activity via labor-leisure trade-o¤, money growth may generate positive real e¤ects on
employment and output. Specically, higher money growth raises the cost of holding money, thus
3 It should be noted that while Andolfatto and Merz study how labor market frictions inuence the e¤ect of
technology shocks on the business cycle in a real production economy, our paper examines the long-run real e¤ect of
steady ination under monetary exchanges.
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reducing real money balances held by households and rms and restricting purchases that require
cash in advance (household consumption and rm wage payment). A direct consequence is to
encourage rms to shift from productionto non-productionactivities, devoting more manpower
to vacancy creation and maintenance. As a result, the job nding rate facing each searching worker
is higher. While the shift from production to non-production activities lowers rms labor demand, a
higher job nding rate raises job matches and the steady-state level of employment. When there are
at least some moderate amount of money being injected to rms and when agentsresponses to labor-
market frictions are su¢ ciently strong, the matching externality e¤ect dominates the conventional
labor demand e¤ect and hence equilibrium employment rises. This therefore creates a channel for
higher money growth to induce possibly higher welfare: the betterment in job matching generates
a large time saving e¤ect in job search by the households, resulting in su¢ ciently higher leisure to
outweigh the modest drop in consumption. The welfare-maximizing ination rate could be positive,
departing from the Friedman rule. A positive optimal rate of money growth can never arise in a
standard cash-in-advance model with labor-leisure choice in the absence of labor market frictions.
The results of positive real e¤ects of money growth and positive rate of optimal ination may be
established when rms and households are responsive to labor market frictions, which is more likely
in relatively low ination regimes, with low job nding rates, and under ine¢ cient wage bargains.
These ndings remain robust, over a wide range of money injection schemes, under alternative cash
constraint setups, and with pre-existing distortionary taxes in a second-best world.
2 The Model
Time is discrete. The basic economy features three theatres of economic activities: a continuum of
identical innitely lived competitive rms (of measure one), a continuum of identical innitely lived
households (of measure one) and a (passive) monetary authority. All individual agents have perfect
foresights. There are two productive factors: capital and labor, both owned by households. Firms
and households exchange in both goods and factor markets. The goods market is Walrasian and
the capital market is perfect, but the labor market exhibits search/entry frictions. While each rm
can create multiple vacancies and each household can choose search intensity endogenously, both
vacancy creation and search intensity are costly.
To avoid complexity involved in managing the distribution of the employed, the unemployed
and their respective cash holdings, we adopt the large householdsframework proposed by Lucas
(1990). Specically, each household can be thought of containing a continuum of memberswho
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are employed (workers) and unemployed (job seekers or searching workers), with the sum of their
mass normalized to unity. All members pool their income as well as their enjoyment of the fruit
of employment (consumption) and unemployment (leisure). Vacancies and job seekers are brought
together through a Diamond (1982) type matching technology, where the ow matches depends on
the masses of both matching parties. Each vacancy can be lled by exactly one searching workers.
At an exogenous rate, lled vacancies and workers are separated every period and separated workers
immediately become job seekers.
Finally, the monetary authority is passive, determining nothing but the issuance of (at) money
and the rule of money injections. In order to o¤er a direct comparison with Lucas (1980) and
Wang and Yip (1992), we consider a benchmark with cash required only for rms wage payments
and households consumption purchases, where rms spending in capital rental and households
spending in capital investment are not subject to cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints. In Section 4.1,
we will discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
2.1 Firms
At period t, a representative rm rents capital kt (beginning-of-period measure) from households
at a gross rental rate rt and employs labor nt at a real market wage rate wt to produce a single
nal good yt under a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas technology. Not all employed workers at the
representative rm are devoted to production. A mass of workers of measure  are employed solely to
maintain the vacancies vt, which can be thought of covering the costs of posting vacancies, managing
personnel-related documentations, as well as providing and maintaining the o¢ ce space. Since such
costs are likely to exhibit scale economies, we postulate: (vt) = v"t , where " 2 (0; 1) reects
the scale economies and  > 0 captures any exogenous shift in the cost of vacancy management.
Accordingly, the measure of workers used for manufacturing is nt   (vt) and the output of the
representative rm can now be specied as: yt = Akt (nt   (vt))1 , with  2 (0; 1) and A > 0:
Let  be the (exogenous) job separation rate and t be the (endogenous) employee recruitment
rate. Since each vacancy can be lled by only one worker, the inow of workers to employment is
tvt and the outow is  nt. Employment within the representative rm thus evolves according to
the following birth-death process: nt+1   nt = tvt    nt, or, by rearranging terms:
nt+1 = (1   )nt + tvt. (1)
Denote the nominal money stock held by the representative rm at the beginning of period t
as MFt , the aggregate price level prevailed in period t as Pt, and the rate of ination from period
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t   1 to period t as t. Further denote by mFt the real money balances held by the representative
rm at the beginning of period t: mFt =
MFt
Pt 1 . Dene the incremental holding of nominal money
balances as ZFt = M
F
t+1  MFt . Then, the incremental holding of real money balances is given by:
zFt =
MFt+1
Pt
  MFtPt = mFt+1  
mFt
1+t
, or, rewriting in forms of the evolution of real money balances by
the representative rm:
mFt+1 =
mFt
1 + t
+ zFt . (2)
We assume that rms must hold money to nance their wage payments, that is, the following
CIA constraint must hold true: Wtnt  MFt . Since vacancy creation and maintenance require
labor inputs, the above specication implies that the rms expenses on labor in both production
(Wt (nt   (vt))) and vacancy activities (Wt(vt)) are cash constrained. By rewriting, the rms
CIA constraint becomes Ptwtnt  mFt Pt 1, or,
wtnt  m
F
t
1 + t
. (3)
Notably, since matching is not instantaneous in this frictional labor market, employment becomes
a state (rather than control) variable. Therefore, given real money injection xFt dened as
XFt
Pt
and
under constraints (1), (2) and (3), the representative rm will, facing the state (nt;mFt ), choose
vacancies, capital demand and incremental real money balances (vt; kt; zFt ) to maximize its value,
 (nt;m
F
t ), which is the sum of the discounted real prot ows yt wtnt rtkt zFt +xFt (inclusive of
net benets related to money holding). Applying the standard dynamic programming techniques,
we can express the representative rms optimization problem in Bellman equation form as:
 (nt;m
F
t ) = max
vt; kt; zFt
h
Akt (nt   (vt))1    wtnt   rtkt   zFt + xFt
i
+
1
1 + rt
 (nt+1;m
F
t+1), (4)
subject to constraints (1), (2) and (3).
2.2 Households
Facing a pooled resource, the representative largehousehold has a unied preference capturing
enjoyment of all its members: the employed, whose fraction is nt, and the unemployed, whose
fraction is 1   nt. The employed is assumed to work full time (normalized to one), while the
unemployed are divided into job searchers, whose fraction is st and leisure takers, whose fraction is
1   st. Thus, the overall fractions of workers, job seekers and leisure takers are nt, st(1   nt) and
(1  st)(1  nt), respectively.
The representative household value both consumption, ct, and leisure, (1   st)(1   nt). Under
this framework, it is obvious that not all unemployed time can be regarded as leisure, because search
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intensity takes away such an enjoyment. Accordingly, the representative households preference can
be written in a standard time-additive form as:

 =
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
U (ct; (1  st)(1  nt)) ,
where  > 0 and U (ct; (1  st)(1  nt)) = c1 t [(1  st)(1  nt)],  2 (0; 1).
Since the household owns capital kt and holds real money balances mHt , its budget constraint
must include both capital investment and incremental holding of real money balances zHt : m
H
t =
MHt
Pt 1 . The incremental holding of real money balances is: z
H
t =
MHt+1
Pt
  MHtPt = mHt+1  
mHt
1+t
, or,
mHt+1 =
mHt
1 + t
+ zHt . (5)
Let  2 (0; 1) denote the constant rate of capital depreciation. Given the market rental and wage
rates (rt; wt), consumption, gross capital investment (kt+1   kt + kt), and incremental real money
balances can be supported by wage and rental income, plus real money injection xHt :
kt+1 = (1   + rt)kt + wtnt   ct   zHt + xHt . (6)
Denote by t the (endogenous) job nding rate. Recall that each vacancy can be lled by only
one worker, so the inow of workers to employment tst(1   nt) net of the outow  nt must be
equal to incremental employment. Thus, similar to those specied in the rms decision above,
employment in the household perspective evolves according to:
nt+1 = (1   )nt + tst(1  nt). (7)
With only consumption requiring cash, the CIA constraint facing the household becomes:
ct  m
H
t
1 + t
. (8)
The representative households optimization problem in Bellman equation form is then:

(kt; nt;m
H
t ) = max
ct; st; zHt
U (ct; (1  st)(1  nt)) + 1
1 + 

(kt+1; nt+1;m
H
t+1), (9)
subject to constraints (5), (6), (7) and (8).
2.3 The Aggregate Economy
A main departure from the real-business cycle search framework is that we do not impose Hosios
(1990) rule of e¢ cient matching for rms and workers to share the surplus. Instead, we follow
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closely the neoclassical distribution of income. Specically, we consider each rms outside option
as 0. Under competitive search, 0 must be treated as given by all individuals. We then consider
that a large household makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er of a potential employee to the rm with
wage demand w. Normalizing 0 = 0 yields a zero protsolution, which is a special benchmark
bargaining outcome. This enables us to focus exclusively on the consequence of labor market frictions
(rather than strategic bargaining) for ination and growth to contrast with ndings in frictionless
neoclassical models. In Section 4.2, we shall return to the case of e¢ cient matching under Hosios
rule to further elaborate the role of e¢ cient bargain played in the welfare cost of ination.
Since the goods market is perfectly competitive, all rms must reach zero prot in equilibrium:
Akt (nt    (vt))1    wtnt   rtkt   zFt + xFt = 0. (10)
Because there is only a single good in the economy, the resource constraint requires that aggregate
goods supply must be equal to aggregate goods demand, which is the sum of consumption and gross
investment:
ct + [kt+1   (1  )kt] = Akt (nt    (vt))1  . (11)
While the capital market is perfect as in the conventional Walrasian models, the labor mar-
ket exhibit search frictions. Given the job separation rate  and the aggregate ow matches Et,
aggregate employment evolves according to the following birth-death process:
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + Et. (12)
Similar to Diamond (1982), the aggregate ow matches depend on the masses of both matching
parties, namely, search intensity augmented job seekers, st(1   Nt), and vacancies, Vt. Assume
the matching technology exhibits constant-returns-to-scale property, as suggested by the empirical
evidence in Blanchard and Diamond (1990) using the U.S. data. We can specify:
Et = B [st(1 Nt)] V 1 t , (13)
where B > 0 measures the degree of matching e¢ cacy and  2 (0; 1).
Since each vacancy can be lled by exactly one searching workers, the tightness of the labor
market to rms, denoted t, can be measured by the ratio of vacancies to searching workers:
t  Vt
1 Nt . (14)
We can then rewrite the aggregate ow matches in terms the current employment, the search
intensity and the tightness of labor market to rms:
Et = B(1 Nt)st 1 t . (15)
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Using (15) and (14), we obtain the employee recruitment rate (t) and the job nding rate (t):
t =
Et
Vt
= B

t
st
 
, (16)
t =
Et
st(1 Nt) = B

t
st
1 
. (17)
Thus, the tighter the labor market is to rms, the lower the employee recruitment rate and the
higher the job nding rate are. An increase in job seekerssearch intensity crowds out job seeking
opportunities and hence reduces the average job nding rate, although it eases rms recruiting
process by raising their employee recruitment rate.
Finally, we specify the monetary authoritys money injection rules. While we follow the conven-
tion assuming that money is injected in a lump-sum fashion, we permit a general money injection
rule that nests the proportional injection rule commonly used in the literature (cf. Lucas 1972
and many subsequent studies) as a special benchmark. Specically, let g  XtMt 
Mt+1 Mt
Mt
denote
the (constant) growth rate of aggregate money supply. At equilibrium, money is injected to each
rm and household according to: XFt = 
F
t Xt and X
H
t =

H
t Xt, with 
F
t +

H
t = 1. Rewriting in
real terms and dening relative injections as ratios to agentsrespective holdings, Ft =

F
t
mFt =mt
and
Ht =

H
t
mHt =mt
, we then have:
xFt =
g
1 + t
Ft m
F
t , (18)
xHt =
g
1 + t
Ht m
H
t . (19)
There are three special cases of interest: (i) benchmark proportional injection:


F
t ;

H
t

= (mFt =mt,
mHt =mt) and
 
Ft ; 
H
t

= (1; 1); (ii) injections to rms only:


F
t ;

H
t

= (1; 0) and
 
Ft ; 
H
t

= 
mt=m
F
t ; 0

; and (iii) injections to households only:


F
t ;

H
t

= (0; 1) and
 
Ft ; 
H
t

=
 
0;mt=m
H
t

.
Combining zero prot condition with resource constraint, we can easily see that aggregate incre-
mental money holdings must be equal to aggregate money injections, yielding the money market
equilibrium condition:
xHt + x
F
t = z
H
t + z
F
t . (20)
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on a steady-state analysis, examining how an increase in money growth
would a¤ect, in the long run, the key economic variables such as employment, output, capital-labor
ratio as well as the variables related to search such as probabilities of job matching, search intensity
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and vacancy rate. We will also discuss the optimal money growth rate in terms of output and
welfare considerations.
The constraints in the representative rms optimization problem consist of two evolution equa-
tions on the state variables, n and mF , and a CIA constraint on wage payments. The constraints
in the representative households optimization problem consist of the laws of motion for three state
variables, k, n and mH , and a CIA constraint on consumption. Both optimization problems can be
solved using standard dynamic programming techniques. For brevity, we relegate the mathematical
details to the Appendix. Instead, we will proceed with solving and characterizing the steady-state
analysis in our model. It will become clear that more assumptions are necessary in order for us to
secure the uniqueness of the steady state.
3.1 Steady State
To economize on notations, we will, in the rest of the paper, use small-case letters without time
subscript to denote the equilibrium aggregate variables in a steady state. Since we are interested in
the long-run perspective and will not look into the transitional dynamics, this abuse of notations
should not cause any confusion.
Labor-market matching in the steady state implies:
 n = s(1  n) = v. (21)
which can be used with other labor-market relationships, (15), (14), (16) and (17), to obtain the
steady-state Beveridge curve,
 = B1=(1 ) =(1 ), (22)
as well as the steady-state number of vacancies, search intensity and market tightness measure:
v =
 n

, (23)
s =
 n
(1  n) , (24)
   n
(1  n)  . (25)
It is clear that in the steady state, the ination rate equals the money growth rate:  = g. From
the denition of incremental real money holdings and under the general money injection rule, we
have:
xi =
g
1 + g
imi = izi (i = F;H). (26)
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Combining the budget constraint (6) and the zero prot condition (10) yields,
c+ k = rk + wn+ x  z = rk + wn+  H   1 zH = rk + wn+  1  F  zF , (27)
where it can be easily veried that
 
H   1 zH =  1  F  zF . Under perfect foresight, the two
CIA constraints both hold with equality in the steady state. Thus,
mF = (1 + g)wn, (28)
mH = (1 + g)c. (29)
In the steady state, the real interest rate is pinned down by,
r = + , (30)
which, together with the capital demand condition, yields the familiar modied golden rule:
Ak 1 (n   (v))1  = + . (31)
Using (27), (31) and (37), we can express the real wage as:
w =
(+ )
 
1 


1 +
 
1  F (g) g

k
n

(32)
We then write aggregate consumption as:
c =

+ 

  

k, (33)
Substituting these two expressions above into (28) and (29) yields the money holding ratio of
households to rms:
mH
mF
=
c
wn
=
[+ (1  )] 1 +  1  F (g) g
(1  ) (+ ) , (34)
We turn next to three important trade-o¤ and equilibrium conditions. As shown in the Appen-
dix, the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ is captured by,
1  
0(v) ( + r)


(1  )Ak (n   (v))  = (1 + r)(1 + g)w, (35)
whereas the relative money injection to rm and the zero prot condition become,
F (g) = 
F
8<:1 + [+ (1  )]
h
1 +

1  F

g
i
(1  ) (+ ) + [+ (1  )] F g
9=; (36)
Ak (n   (v))1  = rk + 1 +  1  F (g) gwn. (37)
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We then arrive at the following condition governing the labor-leisure trade-o¤ (see the Appendix),
(+  + )U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) = wU1 (c; (1  s)(1  n))
(1 + g) (1 + )
. (38)
To understand the channels through which economic aggregates are a¤ected by the rate of
money growth in the steady state requires thorough investigation of the role played by labor market
frictions. As a part of such frictions, vacancy creation and maintenance are costly. Thus, the
equilibrium wage determined by the zero prot condition (37) must be lower than the marginal
product of labor (MPN), given by,
w = (1 D) MPN; (39)
with D measuring the wage discount. However, various money injection schemes may lead to
redistribution between rms and households. As a result, the wage discount D can be larger or
smaller than the vacancy cost ratio (v)n . From (31), (37), and (39), these two measures are related
as follows:
 (v)
n
= 1  1 +  1  F (g) g (1 D), (40)
from which we can see that D = (v)n under the proportional money injection rule (
F = 1).
Another equation that relates w and D comes from equation (35) that captures the vacancy
creation-production trade-o¤:
1  " ( + + )
 

1  1 +  1  F (g) g (1 D)	MPN = (1 + + )(1 + g)w (41)
The impact of a higher money growth rate, g, on equilibrium wage-marginal product ratio, wMPN ,
and the wage discount, D, can be seen clearly from Figure 1, which depicts two straight lines
given by equations (39) and (41). The two lines represent two di¤erent interpretations of D, wage
discount (WD) in equation (39) and vacancy creation-employment ratio (VCER) in equation (41),
respectively. Since MPN is determined by k=(n   (v)) and is, according to (31), independent of
g, so is line WD. On the other hand, the line VCER will be a¤ected by g depending on the money
injection rule (to be further elaborated in the next subsection). Thus, we can solve explicitly from
WD and VCER for the wage discount as a function of the money growth rate (see the Appendix):
D(g) =
 [(1 + + )(1 + g)  1]  " ( + + )  1  F (g) g
 (1 + + )(1 + g)  " ( + + ) 1 +  1  F (g) g . (42)
It can be readily seen that, if the scale economies of vacancy creation is su¢ ciently large such that
 
 ++ > ", then D(g) is always bounded above by one.
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The equations determining the steady state can be re-arranged in a recursive fashion that is
conducive to perform comparative statics. Essentially, we could obtain two equations determining
 and n. The rest of endogenous variables can then be derived easily. The rst of the two equations
has to do with the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ (35), and is henceforth named the VP
locus:
n =


~D(g)
1=(1 ") 
 B
  1
1  

1 
"=(1 ")
, (43)
where
~D(g) =
 

(1 + + )(1 + g)  1 + (1  F (g))g	
 (1 + + )(1 + g)  " ( + + ) 1 + (1  F (g))g ,
which summarizes the channel through which money growth a¤ects the vacancy creation-production
trade-o¤. Notice that other than ~D(g), the VP locus takes the same form regardless of the money
injection rule. The second of the two equations comes from the labor-leisure decision (38), and is
henceforth named the LL locus:
n =

1 +
 

+

1  
1
1  
+ (1  )
+ 

1 +
 
1  F (g) g (1 + g) (1 + )+  + 

 1
.
(44)
Detailed derivations for the VP locus and the LL locus can be found in the Appendix.
It is easy to see that the LL locus is upward sloping in (; n)-space, with n starting from 0 when
 = 0 and approaching a nite upper bound as  approaches innity. The LL locus is concave. To
rule out possibility of non-degenerate multiple equilibria, we assume that " > 1   so that the VP
locus is upward sloping and convex, with n starting from 0 when  = 0 and approaching innity as
 approaches innity. The interior intersection of VP and LL loci denes the steady-state values
of  and n (see Figure 2). With the steady-state values of  and n solved, the rest of endogenous
variables can be derived in a recursive manner.
Finally, applying the modied golden rule, the steady-state capital-labor ratio becomes:
k
n
=

A
+ 
1=(1 ) 
1 +
 
1  F (g) g (1 D (g)), (45)
which is negatively related to the wage discount D (g). The aggregate real output is:
y = A1=(1 )

+ 

 =(1 ) 
1 +
 
1  F (g) g (1 D (g))n, (46)
which also depends on the wage discount negatively. Additionally, we can derive economic welfare
measured by steady-state lifetime utility facing the representative large household:
U(c; (1  s)(1  n)) =

+ 

  
1 
n1 

k
n
1  
1  n   n


. (47)
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3.2 Comparative Statics
We are now prepared for a complete examination of the real e¤ect of money. To begin, let us focus
on the benchmark case with proportional money injections. This is an important benchmark not
only because it has been commonly used in the literature but also because it removes any arbitrary
redistribution between rms and household as a result of money injections  in this case, the
seigniorage tax collected by the monetary authority is fully refunded to money holders in a neutral,
nondistortionary manner.4 Thus, under this benchmark money injection rule, we can study the real
e¤ect of money purely through the neoclassical channel via capital accumulation and the channel
via costly job search and vacancy creation highlighted in this paper.
Recall that under the proportional money injection rule, F (g) = 1 and hence,
(v)
n
= ~D(g) = D(g) =
 [(1 + + )(1 + g)  1]
 (1 + + )(1 + g)  " ( + + ) , (48)
which is strictly increasing in g as long as   ++ > ". Diagrammatically, the line VCER in this
benchmark case rotates down as g increases. The intuition for the rotation is as follows. As money
growth rate increases, the shadow cost of employment tends to increase (see the coe¢ cient of w
on the RHS of 41) because the wage payment is subject to the CIA constraint. For any xed
D <  "( ++) , the wage rate, w, needs to drop to compensate the tendency for the increase in the
shadow cost. Under the condition  > "( + + ) (easily satised when " < 1 and +  is small
relative to  as in our calibration), the two lines intersect with VCER atter than WD.
Intuitively, since in our benchmark model money is injected in a lump-sum fashion that is ex
post proportional to the beginning-of-period money holdings by rms and consumers, the seigniorage
tax imposed on rms and consumers are fully refunded ex post. However, when rms are making
decision, the injections are taken as given. When money growth increases, the cost of holding money
facing rms (and consumers) rises. Other things being equal, the prot is lower. Since employment
is a state variable in a labor search model (and cannot be adjusted within a period), the wage
will be renegotiated. Given the outside option of zero prot for the rm, the rm must bargain
down the real wage, leading to higher wage discount. Since the wage discount is equivalent to the
fraction of employment used to maintain and create vacancy, this employment fraction would be
4 In a typical monetary model with rms, money is often injected to the rms, through an intermediary/nancial
institution (e.g., see Carlstrom and Fuerst 1995 and Christiano and Eichenbaum 1995). It may be noted as an
exception that in the money-in-the-production-function framework developed by Fischer (1974), rms rent capital
and real money balances from the representative household. Since the household is the owner of real money balances,
it is natural that money is injected to the household alone.
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higher, which in turn improves job matching and raises future employment. Mathematically, D(g),
which has the alternative interpretation as the vacancy creation-employment ratio, is an increasing
function of money growth rate, g. In other words, higher money growth shifts employment from
production to non-production activities and raises steady state employment through enhanced job
matching. This establishes the new channel that an increase in money growth encourages vacancy
creation and raises job matches.
Also recall that the VP locus varies with the money injection rule only through ~D(g), which in
the benchmark case becomes:
~D(g) =
 [(1 + + )(1 + g)  1]
 (1 + + )(1 + g)  " ( + + ) .
The LL locus is now,
n =

1 +
 

+

1  
1
1  
+ (1  )
+ 
(1 + g) (1 + )

+  + 

 1
.
It is easily seen that more rapid money supply growth (higher g) will cause both VP and LL to
shift downward, hence n could either increase or decrease (Figure 2 depicts the situation when n
increases as g rises). Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases the cost of holding money,
thereby reducing real money balances held by households and rms and restricting purchases that
require cash in advance. On the one hand, households are forced to lower their consumption c. On
the other hand, rms are forced to shift from production to non-production activities, by devoting
more manpower to vacancy creation and maintenance (which can be seen from (48) that higher g
increases (v)n , thus raising v for a given level of employment n). As a result, the job nding rate
facing each searching worker is higher (referred to as the matching externality e¤ect). While the
shift from production to non-production activities lowers rms labor demand, a higher job nding
rate raises job matches and the steady-state level of employment. When agentsresponses to labor-
market frictions are su¢ ciently strong, the matching externality e¤ect dominates the conventional
labor demand e¤ect and, in this case, equilibrium employment rises.
Thus, our model provide a channel through which higher money growth may induce higher
output. Particularly from (46), if an increase in steady ination raises n more signicantly than
raising D (g), it could lead to a higher real output. This is more likely to arise if labor-market
frictions are severe and wage bargains are not e¢ cient. Moreover, a higher job nding rate also
reduces job search time. From (47), should the reduction in total job search time, measured by
(1   n)S =  n , outweigh the rise in work time n, leisure would increase. Thus, despite the loss in
consumption, a representative households welfare may be higher as a result of higher leisure.
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While the presence of search friction may induce a positive real e¤ect of steady ination similar
to the ndings in the asset substitution setup of Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965), the channels are
very di¤erent.5 Indeed, both the matching-externality-induced positive e¤ect of money growth on
employment and the search-time-induced positive e¤ect of money growth on welfare highlighted in
our model are absent in a conventional frictionless Walrasian economy.
Notably, when bargaining is ine¢ cient, a more likely scenario in developing countries, rms ex-
pand their activity in creating and maintaining vacancies as money growth increases in the bench-
mark case when the rmsoutside option is zero prot and when money injections are proportional
to agentsrespective holdings. While our result depends on rmsoutside option, it remains valid,
by continuity argument, even if we use a small positive prot as the outside option for the rms.
Thus, the remaining issue left to be addressed is how much our result would depends on the money
injection rule, which we now study.
From (36), the relative money injection to rms is captured by,
F (g) =
8<: 1 +
+(1 )
(1 )(+)+[+(1 )]g rms only
0 households only
In the former case with injections to rms only, we arrive at:
~D(g) =
 
n
(1 + + )(1 + g)
h
1 + +(1 )(1 )(+)g
i
  1
o
 (1 + + )(1 + g)
h
1 + +(1 )(1 )(+)g
i
  " ( + + )
n =

1 +
 

+

1  
[+ (1  )] (1 + ) (1 + g)
(1  ) (+ ) + [+ (1  )] g

+  + 

 1
It is clear that ~D(g) is increasing in g, so the VP shifts downward unambiguously as g increases;
moreover, the LL locus shifts upward (see the Appendix for a graphical illustration). Therefore
the e¤ect of money growth on employment is unambiguously positive when money injections are
distributed to rms. In the latter case with injections to households only, we have:
~D(g) =
 (+ )
 (1 + + )  " ( + + )
n =

1 +
 

+

1  
1 + 
1  
+ (1  )
+ 
(1 + g)2

+  + 

 1
Thus, the VP locus is independent of the money growth rate, whereas the LL locus shifts downward.
As a result, higher money growth reduces employment unambiguously. Notably, because the new
5Under the Lucasian CIA constraint, Chang and Tsai (2003) show the presence of positive e¤ects of money growth
when individuals value wealth as social status.
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channel emphasized in this paper must be through the vacancy creation and production trade-
o¤, such a trade-o¤ requires rms to receive money injections otherwise, monetary expansion can
never be benecial for rms. This is why monetary expansion always hurt employment when money
is only injected to households. Of course, just how much such injections to rms are needed for
monetary expansion to be potentially welfare-enhancing is a quantitative issue, to which we now
turn.
3.3 Calibration and Welfare Analysis
We calibrate the benchmark economy with parameter values matching the U.S. annual data over
the post-WWII period. We set the subjective rate of time preference to  = 2%, the rate of
capital depreciation to  = 3:5% and the capital share to  = 0:38. As it can be seen below,
these parameter values will yield reasonable consumption-output ratio and real rental rate. Over
the period mentioned above, the money growth rate is averaged about g = 6:5%. Dening the
search intensity augmented unemployment measure as u = s (1  n)), we can calibrate n + u to
match the labor force participation rate of 61:5%. Based on Shimer (2005), the monthly separation
rate is 3:4%, the monthly job nding rate is 45%, and the matching elasticity is  = 0:72. These
give the annual separation rate and annual job nding rate as  = 1   (1   0:034)12 = 0:339724
and  = 1   (1   0:45)12 = 0:999234, respectively. Using (21), we have: n + u = n(1 +   ) =
n(1+ 0:3397240:999234) = 0:615, which gives the calibrated employment rate, n, at 0:458961. We then follow
Shimer (2005) to normalize the vacancy-unemployed searching worker ratio ( vu) as one, from which
we can utilize (21) to calibrate v = 0:156039,  = S = 0:288407, and B =  =  = 0:999234. Further
normalizing A = 1 and choosing a reasonable wage discount at D = 0:2, we can now use (44) to
calibrate  = :317088 and use (42) and (43) jointly to calibrate  = 0:206034 and " = :435237.
From equations (45)(34), we then obtain: kn = 18:071520, m
H=mF = 1:222874, c = 0:910170 and
y = 1:200464. Based on the ow of funds data computed by Cole and Ohanian (1998, Figure 3), the
household-to-rm money demand ratio in the U.S. from 1952 to 1997, excluding the volatile high
ination period during the oil crises, is mostly between 1 and 2 (32 out of 35 years). Our calibrated
household-to-rm money demand ratio falls right in the range. This calibrated ratio corresponds
to a rm money injection ratio of F = 44:9868% in the benchmark and we will check how our
quantitative results may change in response to di¤erent rm injection ratios. While the capital-
labor ratio yields a realistic real rental rate of 5:5%, the consumption-output ratio of approximately
75% is also reasonable.
We can now revisit the issue of optimum quantity of money. Given the calibration above
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( =  = 0:999234) following Shimers normalization, the Cobb-Douglas matching function implies
that as the money growth rate varies slightly from benchmark of 6:5%, either  or  will hit the
upper bound of unity. In particular, we nd that the only range of money growth rates relevant for
our consideration is [0:06386; 0:065113], within which the welfare declines as the money growth rate
rises. It is thus safe to say that the benchmark money growth rate is close to the optimum.
The question on the optimal ination rate would become much more interesting if an economy
features a less e¢ cient labor market. Consider for illustrative purposes a modied benchmark that is
identical to the U.S. economy except a lower job nding rate at  = 0:80:999234 (which corresponds
to a monthly job nding rate of 12:5% or an average unemployment spell of 8 months). With more
labor-market frictions, the optimal ination rate turns out to be g = 7:5592%, which is signicantly
above the benchmark rate of 6:5% (see Figure 3). This suggests that developing countries may have
an optimal ination rate that is higher than in developed countries if the former has a labor market
with greater frictions. Notably, Khan and Senhadji (2000) reach a similar conclusion for ination
in an empirical investigation in terms of economic growth. In Table 1, we compare key variables
under the benchmark money growth rate and the optimal money growth rate.
Table 1. Comparison between the modied benchmark and the optimal case
Endogenous Variables g = 0:065 g = 0:075592
n 0:431585 0:438905
 0:799387 0:857199
 0:799387 0:668006
k=n 18:071520 17:750489
v 0:183415 0:223212
S 0:322678 0:310013
 0:322678 0:397815
D 0:200000 0:214212
mH=mF 1:222874 1:222874
y 1:128860 1:127614
c 0:855881 0:854936
U 0:664649 0:665318
As discussed in the analytical results above, higher money growth induces the rms to put more
e¤ort in vacancy creation, thereby raising the job nding rate. Under our benchmark parame-
trization, the matching externality e¤ect is dominant and thus higher money growth leads to higher
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employment. The trade-o¤ is to reduce consumption and output, though the magnitude is negligible
due to the opposing e¤ects on the employment rate (positive) and the capital-labor ratio (negative).
Since the betterment in job matching as a result of a suitable increase in money growth generates
a large time saving e¤ect in job search by the households, it results in su¢ ciently higher leisure to
outweigh the modest drop in consumption. As a consequence, an increase in money growth from
the benchmark rate of 6:5% to g enhances economic welfare.
We now return to the issue concerning how the welfare result may change under di¤erent money
injection rules. It is best illustrated by solving quantitatively the optimal ination rate g when
the rm injection ratio F rises from 0 to 1. As depicted in Figure 4, we can see that the optimal
ination rate is positive for all F > 2:2602%. Recall from the previous subsection that when money
is only injected to households (F = 0), the VP locus is independent of the money growth rate and
the matching externality e¤ect through vacancy creation and production is fully shut down. Thus,
monetary expansion always hurt employment and positive ination can never be welfare-enhancing.
When a small amount of money is injected to rms, there is a positive e¤ect of money growth in
conjunction with a negative e¤ect via labor-leisure trade-o¤. As F exceeds the above-mentioned
threshold, the optimal money growth rate becomes positive. Our numerical analysis shows that even
when F is at an extremely low value of 3%, the optimal ination is about 5:4%, far above zero.
When F rises to about 9%, the optimal ination rate increases to 16:9%. Afterward, the optimal
ination starts declining, falling to 3:6% as F = 1 where money is injected to rms only. This hump-
shaped result can be understood as follows. As F continues to rise, the rebate of the seigniorage tax
to households declines and the detrimental labor-leisure trade-o¤ e¤ect increases rapidly, eventually
dominating the matching externality e¤ect through vacancy creation and production. Thus, the
optimal money growth rate starts to decrease when F becomes too large. Overall, not only is the
optimal ination rate positive for most injection schemes, but over a wide range of F 2 (3:2%; 53%)
the optimal ination rate turns out to exceed the benchmark value of 6:5%. Thus, while we need
somemoney injection to rms to ensure that the vacancy creation-production channel can work,
we do not need muchof such injections quantitatively. Notably, while too much of such injections
would lower the optimal rate of ination, we nd that when money is injected to the rms only, the
resulting welfare with the optimal ination rate of 3.6% is higher than under other injection rules
(see Figure 4). This conrms that, in our calibrated economy, the channel through rmsvacancy
creation and production is the ultimate force driving the welfare outcomes.
In summary, the Friedman rule does not hold in our economy. Note that in a standard CIA
model with labor-leisure choice in the absence of labor market frictions, the optimal rate of money
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growth can never be positive (as documented in Wang and Yip 1992, Gomme 1993, and many
others). Moreover, even in the case with a positive real e¤ect of steady ination under our setting,
there is a crucial di¤erence between ours and the Mundell-Tobin model. In their framework, higher
steady ination causes a substitution from real balances to capital, implying a higher capital-labor
ratio in the steady state. In ours, higher steady ination induces the rms to put more manpower
in managing vacancy, which leads to more job matches and increase in employment, thus lowering
the capital-labor ratio in the steady state. Our result is found very robust to a wide range of money
injection rules.
4 Further Discussion
In this section, we check the robustness of our main ndings to alternative CIA constraints or
alternative distribution of matching surplus, under the benchmark proportional money injection
rule. We also check the validity of our main ndings remain in a second-best world with pre-existing
distortionary taxes.
4.1 Alternative Cash-in-Advance Constraints
Consider generalized CIA constraints, where a fraction qF of rms spending in capital rental and
a fraction qH of households spending in capital investment require cash:
wtnt + q
F rtkt  m
F
t
1 + t
(49)
ct + q
H (kt+1   kt + kt)  m
H
t
1 + t
. (50)
In the steady state, rms capital demand becomes:
Ak 1 (n   (v))1  = Q0r, (51)
where Q0 
 
1  qF + qF (1 + r) (1 + g) (= 1 if qF = 0). Moreover, households intertemporal
trade-o¤ and labor-leisure trade-o¤ are given by,
r =
+ 
Q1
(52)
(+  + )U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) = Q2wU1 (c; (1  s)(1  n))
(1 + g) (1 + )
, (53)
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where
Q1 
1  qH (1 + g)
h
1  1(1+)(1+g)
i
1 + qH (1 + g)
h
1  1(1+)(1+g)
i  1 ( = 1 if qH = 0)
Q2 
(1 + )(1 + g)
n
1  qH (1 + g)
h
1  1(1+)(1+g)
io
(1 + )(1 + g)  qH (1 + g)
h
1  1(1+)(1+g)
i  1 ( = 1 if qH = 0).
On the rm side, (51) implies that money growth generates an additional negative e¤ect on
capital demand as a result of a higher user cost of capital. On the household side, the steady-state
real interest rate under generalized CIA constraints is higher than the benchmark case (see (52)),
which discourages capital accumulation; the marginal benet of labor is lower than the benchmark
case (see (53)), which lowers employment. Not surprisingly, both favor a reversed Tobin e¤ect as
in the canonical Walrasian setups in Stockman (1981) and Wang and Yip (1992). However, one
may inquire how large these negative output e¤ects of money growth will be. We argue that they
are indeed modest. On the one hand, capital rental is much smaller than the wage payment while
capital investment is much smaller than consumption. On the other, the fractions
 
qF ; qH

are in
the order of 0:2 or lower, based on Chang and Li (2004) and Liu, Tsou and Wang (2008). Using
our benchmark parametrization with the capital income share of  = 0:38 and qF = qH = 0:2, we
can recalibrate this modied economy to compute Q0 = 1:02472, Q1 = 0:98303 and Q2 = 0:99997,
which are all very close to one. That is, the key relationships are not much di¤erent from the
benchmark CIA setup. Thus, the magnitude of the additional negative output e¤ects of money
growth induced by generalized CIA constraints is not large enough to upset our main ndings,
particularly concerning the departure from the Friedman rule.
4.2 Alternative Distribution of Matching Surplus
We turn now to examining whether applying Hosiosrule of e¢ cient matching would change our
main ndings. Under Hosiosrule, the equilibrium sharing of the matching surplus will be tied to
the matching elasticities. In the benchmark case, the zero prot condition (37) together with the
modied golden rule (31) yields the equilibrium wage as a fraction of the marginal product. Under
Hosiosrule, workers wage (denoted w) is lower than that in the benchmark case (the proof of all
the results in this subsection is relegated to the Appendix):
w = 

1 +
1   
 
"
n  

w + (1  )
"
(1 + ) (1 + g) n1 
k
n
(1  n)  (1 + ) (1 + g) n1 
#
, (54)
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which is a weighted average of the competitive wage rate and a lower value, analogous to the ndings
in Andolfatto (1996). We can rewrite (54) as: w =   w, where w =  1  n MPN and
 = 

1 +
1   
 
"
n  

+ (1  )
24 (1 )(+)
(1 n)(1 )
n(1+)(1+g)   1
35 . (55)
Due to the double holdup problems, this wage ratio generally di¤ers from one. In the absence of
the double holdup problems, the bargained wage rate equals the competitive wage and thus  = 1.
Under Hosiosrule, the labor-leisure trade-o¤ (LL) locus need be modied as:

(1 )(+)
1 


1 n
n
  


(1+)(1+g)

1+ + 

   1
= 
 
1 +
1   
 
"
1
(;n)   1
!
+ (1  )
24 (1 )(+)
(1 n)(1 )
n(1+)(1+g)   1
35 , (56)
where  measures the fraction of labor devoted to vacancy creation and maintenance and is a
function of (; n),
(; n)  
n1 "
"
 


B
 1
1 
#"
.
While the LHS of (56) is decreasing in  and increasing in n, the RHS is increasing in  and may
increase or decrease in n. Thus, we cannot pin down the slope of the LL locus. Should the double
holdup problems be absent, the RHS reduces to one and the LL locus is upward-sloping. When the
households bargaining power is weaker (smaller ), the LL locus is steeper.
Under e¢ cient bargain, the VP locus becomes,
1- "( ++)(;n) 
(1++)(1+g) [1-(; n)]
= 
 
1+
1- 
 
"
1
(;n) -1
!
+ (1-)
24 (1+)(1+g)n(1-)(+)(1-)
1-n- (1+)(1+g)n1-
35 . (57)
This relationship captures the production-vacancy creation trade-o¤ under e¢ cient bargain. When
" ( + + ) <  , both the LHS and the RHS are increasing in  and decreasing in n. As a result,
we cannot determine the slope of the modied VP locus. However, if the double holdup problems
are absent, then the RHS reduces to one and the modied VP locus is still upward-sloping. When
the households bargaining power is weaker (smaller ), the VP locus becomes atter.
Under the calibrated value of bargaining parameter  = 0:72, the double holdup problem is
not negligible. In the calibrated equilibrium mimicking the post-WWII U.S. economy with a lower
job nding rate  = 0:8  0:999234, the LL locus is still upward sloping but the VP locus becomes
downward sloping. As money growth increases, the VP locus shifts downward and the LL locus also
shifts downward but barely. As a result,  and n both decrease in response to higher money growth.
Hence, the optimal ination rate is now much lower than the benchmark case (g = 0:002149) when
 hits the upper bound of unity.
21
4.3 Second-Best Tax Incidence Analysis
One may now inquire whether our main ndings remain valid in a second-best world with an array
of nonzero pre-existing taxes where a full access to the lump-sum tax is unavailable.6 We are
particularly interested in comparing the ination tax with either a consumption tax or a general
income tax.
Denote the consumption tax and general income tax rates as  c and y, respectively, and the
exogenous government spending as Gt (which is for simplicity assumed to be nonproductive and to
yield no utility). Then households budget constraint (6) is modied as:
kt+1 = [1   + (1  y) rt] kt + (1  y)wtnt   (1 +  c) ct   zHt ,
where the direct money injection is now removed to be consistent with the assumption in Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1996). The CIA constraint (8) becomes:
(1 +  c) ct  m
H
t
1 + t
,
where it is reasonable to assume the sales taxes are paid in cash when consumption purchases are
made. The resource constraint (11) is now,
ct + [kt+1   (1  )kt] +Gt = Akt (nt    (vt))1  ,
where, in the absence of a lump-sum tax and under the assumption of proportional money injections,
the following government budget constraint is met:
Gt = y (rtkt + wtnt) +  cct + g [wtnt + (1 +  c)ct] ,
where the last term captures the (real) ination tax on rms wage spending and households
consumption purchase.
While rms optimizing conditions are all unchanged (as the removal of the direct money injec-
tion from rms ow prot would not alter any decisions), some of households optimizing conditions
and equilibrium conditions need be modied. As a consequence, several steady-state equilibrium
relationships are di¤erent from their benchmark counterparts. For brevity, we only highlight a few
key relationships and relegate all mathematical details to the Appendix. While the LL locus is
unchanged (all tax e¤ects cancelled out on the margin because y applies on both capital income
and wage income), the VP locus is now modied as:
n =


D
1=(1 ") 
 B
 1
1  

1 
"=(1 ")
.
6We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this useful exercise.
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where the wage discount D is now a function of (g; y),
D =
 
h
(1 + +1 y ) (1 + g)  1
i
 
h
1 + +1 y

(1 + g)  1
i
+  (1  ")  " +1 y
.
Note that the consumption tax  c does not appear in the steady state relationships (VP and LL loci)
or in the wage discount expression. An increase in the general income tax y has two e¤ects on the
rmsvacancy creation-production trade-o¤, both through the wage discount. First, it raises the real
interest rate (r = +1 y ), which reduces rms incentive to create vacancy because the benet from
higher matching and higher employment next period would worth less in present value (represented
by the term  " +1 y above). The reduction in the rms marginal benet from vacancy creation
requires a larger wage discount in order to maintain zero prot. Second, an increase in the real
interest rate raises the nominal interest rate, (1+ +1 y ) (1 + g)  1, thereby raising the opportunity
cost of nancing wage payments due to the presence of the rmCIA constraint and leading to a
higher wage discount. The resulting increase in the wage discount through both channels in turn
leads to a lower level of employment (VP locus shifts down). Notably, while the ination tax also
a¤ect the level of employment via the nominal interest rate channel, it does not have the additional
e¤ect via the real interest rate as does the general income tax.
To evaluate the welfare e¤ects of money growth and taxes, we express the capital-labor and
consumption-capital ratios as follows:
k
n
=

A
(+ ) = (1  y)
1=(1 )
(1 D) ,
c
k
=
[(1  y)  (1  ) g] +(1 y)   
(1 +  c) (1 + g)
.
Thus, the welfare measured by steady-state lifetime utility is decomposed into four components,
U(c; (1  s)(1  n)) =
 c
k
1 
n1 

k
n
1  
1  n   n


.
Through the wage discount channel, an increase in y lowers the capital-labor ratio. Additionally,
y also has a direct negative e¤ect on the capital-labor ratio via the real interest rate channel
(( + )=(1   y)). By contrast, neither the wage discount nor the capital-labor ratio is a¤ected
by the consumption tax  c the only e¤ect of  c is on the consumption-capital ratio: by taxing
consumption purchases, this ratio is unambiguously lower. Turning now to the e¤ects on leisure
(1   n    n ), we note that there is an extensive margin (via 1   n) and an intensive margin (by
economizing job search, captured by   n ). As discussed above, both g and y have positive impacts
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on the level of employment, thus lowing leisure on the extensive margin. Similar to the analysis using
Figure 2, however, both tax instruments induce large downward shifts in the VP locus accompanied
by small shifts in the LL locus, leading to lower employment-job nding rate ratio (n=). Thus,
an increase in g or y economizes job search and raises leisure on the intensive margin. In our
calibrated economy, we always nd the intensive margin to dominate the extensive margin. We
thus expect that g and y will generate positive leisure e¤ects in the steady state.
In summary, an increase in the consumption tax does not a¤ect any other economic aggregate
but the consumption-output ratio negatively, thereby reducing welfare unambiguously. A higher
general income tax or a higher ination tax, on the one hand, raises employment and (most plausibly)
leisure, and reduces the capital-labor ratio, on the other. Thus, both a¤ects welfare ambiguously
even when their e¤ects on leisure are dominated by the intensive margin.
We recalibrate the modied benchmark economy (with  = 0:8  0:999234) under the zero prot
setup and obtain  = 0:316530,  = 0:162182 and " = 0:371870. While  is very close to the
modied benchmark gure,  and " are both lower than their counterparts. Concerning the second-
best tax incidence analysis, we set the pre-existing ination tax rate the same as before (g = 6:5%)
and choose the consumption and general income tax rates as  c = 5% and y = 20% (which are
commonly chosen in the dynamic tax incidence literature calibrating the U.S. economy). These
yield a government spending G = 0:295544.
We conduct three government revenue-neutral tax incidence exercises. In the rst, we x the
consumption tax rate at  c = 5% and G = 0:295544 to maintain revenue-neutral. We nd that the
optimal tax mix is: (g; y) = (10:57%; 14:20%). In the second exercise, we x the general income tax
rate at y = 20% and again G = 0:295544 to obtain the optimal tax mix (g; c) = (8:64%; 0:36%).
These two pair-wise exercises suggest a shift toward the ination tax. Nevertheless it is never
optimal to fully replace consumption or general income taxes by the ination tax. Finally, in the
last exercise, we calculate the global optimal tax mix given G = 0:295544 to obtain (g; y; c) =
(10:48%; 0%; 26:77%). Notice that under the pre-existing tax rates given above, ination, general
income and consumption taxes account for about 24:9%, 66:7% and 8:4%, respectively, of the total
government revenue. In the optimal tax mix scheme, their revenue shares become 49:7%, 0% and
50:3%, respectively. To understand the global optimal tax mix result, we note that the direct
negative e¤ect of the general income tax is quantitatively too large to be compensated by the
positive employment and (most plausibly) leisure e¤ects. As a consequence, it is optimal for income
to be tax-exempted. Thus, when it is optimal to fully eliminate the distortionary general income
tax, tax burdens must fall on the ination and the consumption taxes. However, the welfare-cost
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trade-o¤ between the ination tax and the consumption tax is never strong enough to lead to an
optimal tax scheme with one tax being fully replaced by another.
To the end, we compare our ndings with those established by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1996) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). Their papers consider both cash and credit consumption
goods, where money can be regarded as an intermediate good that produces the nal consumption
good. By the intermediate good principle (cf. Diamond and Mirrlees 1971), the ination tax is
distortionary. Moreover, the uniform taxation principle (cf. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972) requires
that both cash and credit goods be taxed equally. Thus, an ination tax levied only on the cash
good is distortionary. To avoid both distortionary margins, the Friedman rule is optimal in a class
of homothetic preferences that are separable in consumption and leisure. In our paper, money can
also be regarded as an intermediate good serving to facilitate transactions in rms wage payments
and households consumption purchases. However, in the presence of labor-market frictions, our
model exhibits trade-o¤s in vacancy creation and production use of labor, as well as trade-o¤s in
labor, job search and leisure. Such trade-o¤s yield a new channel through which steady ination
raises employment and leisure in the long run, thus invalidating the Friedman rule in our calibrated
economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
By constructing a monetary growth model where cash is required for wage payments and consump-
tion purchases, we have shown that labor market frictions play an important role in creating new
channels through which steady ination inuences the real activity in the long run. The key el-
ements of labor market frictions considered in our benchmark framework include costly vacancy
creation and job search as well as imperfect job matches. While there is a prototypical detrimental
e¤ect of money growth via labor-leisure trade-o¤, we have identied, with at least some moderate
amount of money being injected to rms, there exists a positive real e¤ect due to the encouragement
of steady ination to create new vacancies and to raise job matches.
Some valuable lessons from our calibration exercises are summarized as follows.
 When the economy exhibits relatively low ination, positive real e¤ects of money growth may
arise in which higher steady ination, via more vacancy creation and better job matches, raises
employment and saves job search time. In this case, the optimal rate of ination is positive,
departing from the Friedman rule.
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 When wages are determined by competitive prot conditions, the greater labor-market fric-
tions, the larger the positive real e¤ect of money growth and the optimal ination rate.
 When bargaining ine¢ ciency is removed under Hosios rule in an economy with signicant
labor-market frictions, the benet of money growth is signicantly reduced. Under our cal-
ibrated economy with a job nding rate 20% lower than one in the U.S., the real e¤ect of
money growth is almost absent and the optimal ination rate is close to zero.
 Even in a second-best world with pre-existing distortionary consumption and general income
taxes, the Friedman rule still fails to hold under our benchmark parametrization with wages
being determined by competitive prot conditions. Under our calibrated economy with a job
nding rate 20% lower than one in the U.S., it is optimal to fully eliminate general income
tax and to have positive ination and consumption tax.
Our quantitative results are generally consistent with recent empirical studies investigating the
long-run money-output relationship.
We have focused on providing a thorough characterization of the real e¤ects of steady ination
via the labor-leisure-search trade-o¤ in the presence of labor market frictions and have been ab-
stracting any pecuniary costs associated with job search and vacancy creation. Our model may be
generalized to include such costs. In doing so, one may mimic better the real world and conduct
calibration analysis matching better with the observed rates of job turnover and unemployment.
Another simplifying assumption is the utility function specication. Should the utility function be
nonhomothetic (in consumption and search-intensity augmented e¤ective leisure), the employment
rate may a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor di¤erently and
hence steady ination may a¤ect the ratio of household to rm money holding, depending on the
severity of labor market frictions. This extension may thus provide a plausible explanation for the
sharp movements in the ratio of money holding over the past few decades in the U.S. Finally, our
framework is ready for a comprehensive study of monetary transmission over the business cycle. In
particular, one may set up the stochastic processes for the technological factor (A) and the mon-
etary growth rate (g) and then characterize monetary transmission by log-linearizing the system
governing the equilibrium dynamics. Search frictions may be viewed as real rigidities that may
permit a better t with the data in impulse responses of output, employment and factor returns
with respect to monetary shocks.
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Appendix
(Not Intended for Publication)
In this appendix, we derive the optimizing conditions for the representative rm and the repre-
sentative household, the second-order condition for vacancy creation, three important relationships
presented in the main text, the wage and the equilibrium solution under Hosiosrule, as well as the
conditions governing the second-best tax incidence analysis.
1. Optimizing Conditions for a Representative Firm
Denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the rms CIA constraint as F . By substi-
tuting the evolution equations into the households next-period value function, the representative
rms optimization problem can be written in Bellman equation form as follows:
 (n;mF ) = max
v; k; zF
h
Ak (n   (v))1    wn  rk   zF + xF
i
+
1
1 + r
 

(1   )n+ v; m
F
1 + 
+ zF

+ F

mF
1 + 
  wn

.
Note that the subscript t is no longer necessary and is dropped. The rm decides on (i) how many
vacancies to create (v); (ii) how much capital to rent (k), and (iii) how much real money balance to
acquire (zF ). Let F denote the rms vector of state variables this period, namely, F = (n;mF ).
Let F 0 denote the same vector next period. The rst-order conditions are:

1 + r
 1
 F 0 = (1  )0(v)Ak (n   (v))  , (58)
Ak 1 (n   (v))1  = r, (59)
 2(F 0) = 1 + r. (60)
Equation (58) states that for optimality, the benet from creating additional vacancy in order to
make new hires should equal the cost in terms of sta¤-time necessary to make these vacancies
available to the searching workers. In Section 3 of this Appendix, we derive the second-order
condition for vacancy creation, which is then veried in the numerical exercises. Equation (59)
is the standard capital demand equation. Equation (60) indicates that the return from acquiring
additional real money balance this period, which comes in the form of a more relaxed CIA constraint
next period, should equal the opportunity cost of holding money.
In addition, the optimality also requires the Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions, which can be
simplied as follows by making use of the rst order conditions above:
 1(n;m
F ) =

1 +
0(v) (1   )


(1  )Ak (n   (v))    (1 + F )w, (61)
 2(n;m
F ) =

1
1 + r

1
1 + 

 2

(1   )n+ v; m
F
1 + 
+ zF

+
F
1 + 
,
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which, when using (60), gives rise to:
 2(n;m
F ) =
1 + F
1 + 
. (62)
2. Optimizing Conditions for a Representative Household
Denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the households CIA constraint H . By sub-
stituting the evolution equations into the households next-period value function, the representative
households optimization problem can be written in Bellman equation form as follows:

(k; n;mH) = max
c; s; zH
U (c; (1  s)(1  n))
+
1
1+



(1-+r)k + wn  c  zH + xH ; (1- )n+ s(1-n); m
H
1+
+zH

+ H

mH
1+
  c

.
Let H denote the vector of state variables this period, namely, H = (k; n;mH). Let H0 denote
the triplets next period. The rst-order conditions are:
U1 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) = 1
1 + 

1(H0) + H , (63)

1 + 

2(H0) = U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) , (64)

3(H0) = 
1(H0). (65)
In equation (63), the appearance of H captures the additional shadow cost of increasing con-
sumption due to the presence of the CIA constraint. Equation (64) states that the employment
gain next period from a marginal increase in search intensity this period equals the disutility from
the corresponding reduction in leisure. Equation (65) equates the benet of acquiring an additional
real money balance that relaxes the CIA constraint for the next period, to the opportunity cost of
foregone capital accumulation.
The Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions are given as follows:

1(H) = (1   + r)
1 + 

1(H0), (66)

2(H) =  (1  s)U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) + w
1 + 

1(H0) + (1     s)
1 + 

2(H0), (67)

3(H) = 1
(1 + ) (1 + )

3(H0) + 
H
1 + 
. (68)
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3. The Second-order condition for vacancy creation:
From the optimization problem is given by,
 (n;mF ) = max
v; k; zF
h
Ak (n   (v))1    wn  rk   zF + xF
i
+
1
1 + r
 

(1   )n+ v; m
F
1 + 
+ zF

+F

mF
1 + 
  wn

.
The rst-order condition with respect to v is:
 (1  )Ak (n   (v)) v + 
1 + r
 1
 F 0 = 0,
while the second-order condition requires:
 (1  )Ak (n   (v))  1 (v)2   (1  )Ak (n   (v)) vv + 
2
1 + r
 11
 F 0
=   
1 + r
 1
 F 0 "
v

 (v)
n   (v)  
(1  ")
"

+
2
1 + r
 11
 F 0 < 0,
where vv =  (1  ")vv .
Note that dening the vacancy cost ratio as V CR  (v)n , we then have:
 1(n;m
F ) = (1  )Ak (n   (v))    w + 1   
1 + r
 1(F 0)  Fw
=
8<:1 +
(1  )
 "  V CR
1  V CR   (1 + g)(1 + + )
9=; 1   (+ )kn ,
 11(n;m
F ) =  (1  )Ak (n   (v))  1
=  (1  ) (+ )
(n   (v)) (1  V CR)
k
n
.
Thus, the second-order condition requires:
  
1 + r
 1
 F 0 "
v

 (v)
n   (v)  
(1  ")
"

+
2
1 + r
 11
 F 0
=   
1 + r
8<:1 +
(1  )
 "  V CR
1  V CR   (1 + g)(1 + + )
9=; (1  )(+ ) kn "v

 (v)
n   (v)  
1  "
"

  
2
1 + r
(1  )(+ )
(n   (v)) (1  V CR)
k
n
< 0,
which we verify in our numerical exercises.
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4. The Vacancy-Production Trade-o¤, the Relative Money Injection to Firms, the Zero Prot Con-
dition and the Labor-leisure Trade-o¤ Equations:
Substituting (60) and  = g into (62), one obtains: F = r+ (1+ r)g: This expression can then
be used in (61) and the resulting equation can be combined with (58) to yield:

1 + r

1 +
0(v) (1   )


(1  )Ak (n   (v))    (1 + r)(1 + g)w

= (1  )0(v)Ak (n   (v))  ,
which can be simplied to arrive at the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ relationship (35) after
replacing  by  n=v.
From (26), (28) and (29), we obtain: 
1  F  zF =  1  F  g
1 + g
mF =
 
1  F  gwn,
F = 
F m
mF
= 
F

1 +
c
wn

.
Substituting (34) into the latter expression, we can derive (36). With this, (37) follows immediately.
Next, from (65) and (68), we have:
H = (1 + g)

1  1
(1 + )(1 + g)


1(H);
which can be substituted into equation (63) to arrive at:
U1 = (1 + g)
1(H).
Combining this latter equation with (64) and (67), one obtains:
1  1     s
1 + 

1 + 

U2 =  (1  s)U2 + w
1 + 
U1
1 + g
which can be simplied to produce the labor-leisure trade-o¤ equation (38).
5. The Wage Discount Function:
Equations (39) and (41) can be combined to yield,
1  " ( + + )
 

1  1 +  1  F (g) g (1 D)	 = (1 + + )(1 + g)(1 D)
or, manipulating,
D = 1 
1  "( ++) 
(1 + + )(1 + g)  "( ++) 

1 +
 
1  F (g) g ,
which can be simplied to generate the wage discount function (42).
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6. The VP Locus:
From (35) and (39), we have:
1  
0(v) ( + + )


MPN = (1 + + )(1 + g)(1 D)MPN;
or, by eliminating MPN and using (21), (22) and (40),
1  " ( + + ) (v)
v

= (1 + + )(1 + g)
1   (v)v
1 +
 
1  F (g) g
or,
(1 + + )(1 + g)  1 +  1  F (g) g
 (1 + + )(1 + g)  " ( + + ) 1 +  1  F (g) g =  ( n)" 1

B
  1
1  

1 
"
which can be simplied to yield the VP locus (43).
Non-negativity of employment requires that
 +
   " ( + + )
(+ ) + (1 + + )g
> 0, namely,
 (1 + + )(1 + g)
( + + )
> ":
7. The LL Locus:
From labor-leisure decision (38),
w = (1 + g) (1 + )
(+  + )

U2
U1
= (1 + g) (1 + )
(+  + )



1  

c
(1  s)(1  n)
From (37), (31), (26), (28),
1  

(+ )k = wn+
 
1  F (g) zF = 1 +  1  F (g) gwn
or,
w =
(+ )
 
1 


1 +
 
1  F (g) g

k
n

Equating the two expressions to eliminate w yields,
(+ )
 
1 


1 +
 
1  F (g) g

k
n

=


1  

(1 + g) (1 + )

+  + 


c
(1  s)(1  n)
=


1  

(1 + g) (1 + )

+  + 


+ (1  )
(1=n  (1 +   ))

k
n

or,
1
n
= 1 +
 

+


1  

1
1  

+ (1  )
+ 

1 +
 
1  F (g) g (1 + g) (1 + )+  + 


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which generates the LL locus (44).
8. Intertemporal and Labor-Leisure Trade-o¤s under Generalized CIA Constraints:
Under generalized CIA constraints, some of households optimizing conditions need be modied
as follows:
U1 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) = 1
1 + 

1(H0) + H
 
1  H

3(H0) + HH = 
1(H0)

1(H) = (1   + r)
1 + 

1(H0)  HHr

2(H) =  (1  s)U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) + w
1 + 

1(H0) + (1     s)
1 + 

2(H0)  HHw
Using the rst three equalities together with (64) to express H , 
1(H0), 
2(H0), and 
3(H0) in
terms of U1 and U2, and substituting these results into the last two equations, we obtain modied
intertemporal and labor-leisure trade-o¤s, (52) and (53).
9. Diagrammatic analysis when money injections are distributed to rms:
When money injections are distributed to rms only, the VP and LL loci are depicted in the
following.
Figure 5: An Increase in the Growth Rate of Money
When Money Injections are Distributed to Firms
VP
LL with a higher g
μ
n
VP with a higher g
LL
10. Hosiosrule:
Recall that the competitive wage rate under zero prot is given by w =
 
1  n

MPN , where
MPN = (1   )A

k
n (v)

. Denote the e¢ cient matching wage rate under Hosiosrule as w.
Since the ow cost of vacancy creation is  dy=dv = v MPN , we can compute rms ow prot
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per match as follows:
R = max
k=n

y
n
  r k
n
  w

=

1  
n

MPN   w
= w   w.
Firmsunmatched value (U ) and matched value (M ) accrued from a successful bargain with
their employees can be specied as:
U =  v MPN + 1
1 + r
h
M
0
+ (1  )U
0i
, (69)
M =

1  
n

MPN   w + 1
1 + r
h
(1   )M
0
+  U
0i
. (70)
In the absence of rms entry cost, we have: U
0
= U = 0. Thus, applying the functional form of
(v) and (21), we use (69) and (70) to derive:
M
0
=
1 + r

v MPN , (71)
SF = M  U
=

1  
n

+
1   
 
"

n

MPN   w. (72)
Combining (63) and (68) and making use of (65), we can eliminate H to obtain 
1(H0) =

3(H0) = 11+U1. In the steady state, we can substitute the previous expression into (67) to derive:

2 =
1
(+  + s)

  (1 + ) (1  s)U2 + w

1 + 
U1

.
Equations (27) and (30) yield:
c = k + wn. (73)
From the competitive wage rate equation mentioned above and (31), we have:
k
n
=

(1  )(+ )w: (74)
Now, by applying (21), (27) and  = g; and making use of the two equations above, the matching
surplus accrued to a household from a successful match (in unit of goods) can be derived as:
SH =

2
U1
=
1  n
 +  (1  n)

  (1 + ) 
1  
c
1  n +
w
1 + g

=
1
 +  (1  n)

  (1 + ) 
1  k +

(1  n)  (1 + ) (1 + g) n1 
1 + g

w

. (75)
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In a Nash bargain, the wage is solved by maximizing the joint surplus, taking as given the
competitive rental rate, matching probabilities and state variables. Hosios rule implies that to
reach the bargaining frontier, the bargaining shares have to be the same as the powers in the
matching function. Thus, the bargaining problem is given by,
max
w
 
SH
  
SF
1 
.
Noting that v =  n is taken as given (as do , k;MPN and w) and thus both S
F and SH are
linear in w. As a consequence, the rst-order condition to the Nash bargain problem exhibits the
conventional form:
SF = (1  ) (1 + g) [ +  (1  n)]
(1  n)  (1 + ) (1 + g) n1 
SH , (76)
which, together with (72) and (75), implies:


1 +
1   
 
"
n  

w   w

= (1  )
(
  (1 + ) (1 + g)
n
1 
k
n
(1  n)  (1 + ) (1 + g) n1 
+ w
)
.
Thus, the wage can be solved as in (54).
Next, we will reduce all the steady state conditions into a 2  2 system of equations in (; n).
From (38), (21) and (73), we have:
w = (1 + ) (1 + g)
+  + 

U2
U1
= (1 + ) (1 + g)

1 +
+  



1  
 kn + w

1 n
n    
,
or, solving w leads to:
 =

(1 )(+)
1 


1 n
n
  


(1+)(1+g)

1+ + 

   1
. (77)
From (22) and (23),  = B1=(1 ) =(1 ) and v =  n , so we have:
 = 
"
 n


B
 1
1 
#"
,
which is an increasing function of n and . Also, one can get the shares of employees in creat-
ing/maintaining vacancies and in production:

n
=

n1 "
"
 


B
 1
1 
#"
 (; n); n  
n
= 1  (; n);
where  is increasing in  and decreasing in n. Substituting these expressions into (55) yields:
 = 
 
1 +
1   
 
"
1
(;n)   1
!
+ (1  )
8<:

(1 )(+)
(1 n)(1 )
n(1+)(1+g)   1
9=; : (78)
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Comparing (78) with (77) ; we obtain (56).
We now turn to another fundamental relationship, using the vacancy creation condition (35),
which can be rewritten as:
 =
1
(1 + + )(1 + g)
1  "( ++) (; n)
1  (; n) , (79)
which is increasing in n and . This expression can be compared with (78) to yield (57).
11. Sensitivity Analysis:
While our pre-set parameters in the calibration exercises are all justied, some of the calibration
criteria and some of the calibrated parameter values may be argued questionable. We therefore
perform a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results. In particular, we consider the
following alternatives:
 Since our calibration of the labor market follows the recent work by Shimer (2005), we for
consistency set, in the benchmark case, the matching technology parameter  = 0:72 as in
Shimer, which is arguably high as compared to Blanchard and Diamond (1990) with  = 0:40
and Hall (2008) with  = 0:54. In the rst sensitivity analysis, we recalibrate  to the lowest
value 0:40.
 We calibrated B based on an assumed vacancy-unemployed search worker ratio of one as in
Shimer (2005). We now explore the alternative by allowing B to be 10% below or above its
benchmark value.
 We also allow four other crucial parameters to be 10% below or above its benchmark value to
check how robust our main ndings are.
The sensitivity analysis results are reported in Table 2 below. Our results deliver two important
messages. First, under the zero prot setup with an ine¢ cient wage bargain, the Friedman rule
is never valid in a wide set of parametrization. The more frictional the labor market is (lower
matching e¢ cacy B, higher job separation  , or more costly vacancy creation ), the greater the
optimal ination rate will be. Second, the optimal ination rate is always lower when the wage
bargain is e¢ cient, satisfying Hosios rule. In some cases, the Friedman rule may hold with an
e¢ cient wage bargain  it is the case when the matching elasticity of unemployed workers is low
(low ), the matching e¢ cacy is low (low B), the job separation rate is low (low  ), the vacancy
creation is more costly (high ), the scale economies of vacancy creation is low (high "), and when
welfare is more sensitive to leisure (high ). It is of particular interest to note that when  = 0:40,
there are in fact two nondegenerate equilibria. The one that is not reported in Table 2 involves
an unrealistically low employment rate (about 17%) and implausibly high unemployment duration
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(about 7:5 years).7
Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis on Optimal Ination
g under zero prot g under Hosiosrule
Benchmark 0:075592 0:002149
 = 0:40 0:069569 0
B
up 10%
down 10%
0:066394
0:086607
0:039491
0
 
up 10%
down 10%
0:087162
0:063729
0:039022
0

up 10%
down 10%
0:081890
0:068979
0
0:024613
"
up 10%
down 10%
0:053374
0:104442
0
0:046782

up 10%
down 10%
0:077166
0:074117
0
0:010785
12. Second-Best Tax Incidence Analysis:
In the second-best tax incidence model, three households optimizing conditions, namely, (63),
(66) and (67), must be modied:
U1 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) = (1 +  c)

1
1 + 

1(H0) + H

,

1(H) = 1   + (1  y) r
1 + 

1(H0),

2(H) =  (1  s)U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) + (1  y)w
1 + 

1(H0) + (1     s)
1 + 

2(H0).
In the steady state, (27), (29), (30), (31), and (38) become:
(1 +  c) (1 + g)c+ k = (1  y) (rk + wn)  gwn,
mH = (1 +  c) (1 + g)c,
r =
+ 
1  y ,
Ak 1 (n   (v))1  = + 
1  y ,
(+  + )U2 (c; (1  s)(1  n)) =

1  y
1 +  c

wU1 (c; (1  s)(1  n))
(1 + g) (1 + )
.
7When  ! 0, the VP locus becomes concave and stays above the LL locus so that a nondegenerate steady state
no longer exists.
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Repeating the same procedures as in appendix sections 3 and 4 above, we can derive the VP and
LL loci. In addition to those steady-state expressions reported in the main text, the following
steady-state relationships also di¤er from the benchmark ones:
c
n
=
[(1  y)  (1  ) g] +(1 y)   
(1 +  c) (1 + g)
k
n
,
w =
1  

+ 
1  y
k
n
,
m
n
= (1 + )
h
(1 +  c)
c
n
+ w
i
=
"
(1 + 1 1 y )(+ )

  
#
k
n
,
y
n
=
+ 
 (1  y)
k
n
,
y = A1=(1 )

+ 
 (1  y)
 =(1 )
(1 D)n.
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